A PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 407 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO CONFORM WITH
THE UNDERLYING RELEVANCY RATIONALE FOR THE RULE IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
LIABILITY ACTIONS* **
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence

on public policy grounds. Rule 407 is one example. In its current form as amended in 1997, the
rule provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are
taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a
product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.1
What Rule 407 does is to prevent the use of evidence of remedial measures taken after an
event that caused an injury or harm in order to prove negligence, culpable conduct, or strict
product liability. The primary rationale for such exclusion is that individuals, corporations, or
municipalities should not be discouraged from taking remedial measures that may prevent future
injury or harm to individuals. While Rule 407 provides for broad exclusion, its current language
is limited to remedial measures which are taken after an event that may have caused the injury or
harm. We suggest that the language of Rule 407 be amended to preclude the admissibility of
remedial measures which are taken both before and after an injury. This change will implement
the relevancy rationale for the rule.
II.

PURPOSE OF 1997 AMENDMENT
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The original language of the 1975 version of Rule 407 barred the admissibility of
remedial measures taken “after an event”2 as an admission of negligence or culpable conduct.
However, this language was ambiguous as to what constituted the critical “event”3 that would
trigger exclusion.4 The 1997 amendment was intended to clarify this ambiguity by rephrasing
the rule to only bar remedial measures taken “after an injury or harm, allegedly caused by an
event.”5 Additionally, the 1997 amendment adopted the predominant judicial view that Rule 407
also applies to exclude subsequent remedial measures in strict product liability cases.6
The Advisory Committee explained that this change in the language was necessary “to
clarify that the rule applies only to changes made after the occurrence that produced the damages
giving rise to the action.”7 The rule “does not apply to bar evidence of preventive measures
taken before an accident.”8 The amendment was intended to supersede the “minority view that
applied Rule 407 to exclude ... evidence of pre-accident conduct.”9 The justification was that
such evidence need not be excluded under Rule 407 but it could be excluded under Rule 401 and
Rule 403 relevancy principles.
III.

HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS

A. Codification of Common Law
Formalization of the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures as an admission of
negligence or culpability was developed by the courts in England and the United States as a
common law rule of evidence.10 It precluded the introduction and circumstantial use of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures to show negligence or culpability.11 As early as 1892, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that such evidence is “incompetent”12 and noted that
the only two states that allowed the use of “subsequent changes [as] evidence of prior
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negligence” – Pennsylvania and Kansas – did not justify their position by “satisfactory
reasons.”13 In 1942, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the Model Code which became
the first official collection of common law rules of evidence, including “one of the first, and
simplest, promulgations of the remedial measures rule.”14
Almost immediately after its release, the Model Code met strong opposition from within
the ALI itself. The dissenting view – that the Model Code granted excessive discretion to the
trial judge15 – was the major point of contention and is seen as the most “common explanation”
for the failure of the Model Code.16 Noting the rejection of the Model Code by the states, the
American Bar Association (ABA) collaborated with the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to create the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which offered
another version of the rule against the admissibility of remedial measures.17 However, this
proposed reform was met with the same disinterest as the Model Code. In fact, only three states
initially adopted the Uniform Rules.18 It was not until January 3, 1975 that President Ford signed
the new Federal Rules of Evidence into law, thus establishing, at least in the federal courts, an
exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial measures.19
B. Purpose of the Rule
Exclusion of evidence under Rule 407 is based on public policy considerations and
evidentiary rationale.20 Simply stated, the public policy purpose of Rule 407 is to “encourag[e]
people to take, or at least not discourag[e] them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety”21 and that such remedial measures are “not an admission”22 of negligence, culpable
conduct, or strict liability in product design, manufacture, or a need for a warning or instruction.
The evidentiary rationale is that such evidence is unfairly prejudicial with little probative value
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because it has the potential to excite the sympathies of the jury and to lead it to find liability from
remedial actions rather than from more relevant and probative evidence.23
i.

Public Policy Basis
Exclusion is founded on public policy considerations that without the protection afforded

by Rule 407, individuals, corporations, and municipalities would not take corrective steps after
an injury or harm to prevent similar future injury or harm for fear that evidence of the remedial
measures would be used against them in future litigation24 to circumstantially show negligence,
culpability, or strict product liability.25
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that this policy justification for exclusion under Rule
407 is flawed because it is probable that a reasonable would-be defendant, even without the
protection of Rule 407, “would be very likely to take corrective measures in order to avoid more
serious liability for future accidents.”26 Professor Rice has also suggested that the presumption
that people may be dissuaded from taking remedial measures, if such evidence could be used as
an admission of fault, may be defective because such a conclusion requires an acceptance that 1)
the “existence of the privilege against the introduction of such evidence is generally known,”
which is highly unlikely; and 2) that “people risk future liability through potential injuries to
others as a result of the continued existence of the condition, rather than risk the increased
possibility of being found liable for the injury that has already occurred by changing that
condition.”27 Nonetheless, in spite of serious logical flaws, this policy rationale remains a
credible justification for the rule.
ii.

Relevancy Basis
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The evidentiary basis for the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures as
an admission of negligence, culpability, or material issues in product liability cases is a common
sense conclusion that evidence of remedial measures is of “marginal relevance” and almost
always substantially more prejudicial than probative.28 Another view suggests that such
evidence “tends to be more persuasive than is logically justified.”29 The concern is that a jury
may give excessive weight and consideration to evidence of subsequent remedial measures
instead of focusing its attention to other more probative evidence on the material facts in dispute.
In fact, subsequent remedial measures are usually not determinative on the finding that the
defendant had breached an established duty of care, “because he might have made the repairs to
correct conditions that either did not exist or were not apparent until after the accident.”30
iii.

Application in Negligence Cases
Cases arising out of negligence require the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a

“duty not to expose the plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, that the defendant
breached that duty as defined by the applicable standard of care, that the breach [proximately]
caused the damage, and that there was actual damage.”31 All four elements must be proved in
order to establish a prima facia case for negligence.32
The policy consideration for applying Rule 407 to negligence cases is that the reasonable
person of ordinary prudence, who becomes aware of a dangerous or a potentially an injurycausing condition, “may be expected to do everything feasible to remedy that condition
regardless of the reasonableness of [his] earlier care.”33 The relevancy basis for exclusion under
Rule 407 is the idea that there is no presumptive connection between an injury and breach of an
established duty of care.34 This makes evidence of subsequent remedial measures unfairly
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prejudicial because the jury may become confused and find liability based on the improper
inference that post injury corrective steps necessarily implies a breach of an established duty of
care.
Rule 407 retains the four-part structure of the tort of negligence. It allows would-be
defendants an opportunity to “do as they please until they become aware that their actions harm
others, at which point they acquire a duty to avoid harm[] that cost the victim more than they
profit the actor.”35 In effect, the rule prevents courts from punishing potential defendants for
taking remedial measures that “the law and good citizenship require.”36 It avoids imposing
liability on a defendant who did not have a duty of care, established or implied, but who
nonetheless made an effort to ensure that similar injury or harm does not take place again, while
retaining liability where there has been a clear showing of a breach of a duty of care.37
iv.

Application in Strict Product Liability Cases
Strict liability cases require the plaintiff to show that the defendant manufactured, sold, or

distributed a product with a defective design, manufacture, or insufficient warning.38 Prior to
1997, there was substantial disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether Rule 407
applies to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases.39 However,
the 1997 amendment expressly adopted the majority view,40 precluding the use of such evidence
to show “a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design or a need for a warning or
instruction.”41
Prior to the amendment, the most common and compelling rationale for applying the
exclusionary rule to product liability actions was grounded on the social policy “desire” not to
deter remedial measures by manufacturers.42 It has been suggested by Professor Lampert that
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this justification is not always accurate43 because corporations are under a common statutory
duty to make repairs and may be liable for punitive damages if they “ignore known dangers.”44
It is his opinion that this duty and potential statutory liability likely overshadow “any incentive
the rules of evidence may give them to forgo making repairs.”45 However, as the Ninth Circuit
explained that practically speaking, there is no “difference between strict liability and negligence
in defective design cases,”46 and as such, the rationale for encouraging remedial measures
“remains the same.”47
From an evidentiary standpoint, the focus of a judicial inquiry in strict liability cases
centers on the “condition of the product ‘at the time it leaves the seller’s hands’” and not its
condition at the time of injury.48 To admit evidence of remedial measures taken after the event
that caused the injury or harm would introduce facts that are outside the scope of the jury’s
consideration. Consequently, such evidence becomes unfairly prejudicial because it may lead
the jury to find liability by considering the condition of the product after remedial measures,
rather than focusing on the condition of the product at the time that it was released into the
stream of commerce.49
C. Remedial Measures
The remedial measure contemplated by Rule 407 is “any kind of change, repair, or
precaution.”50 While this definition is broad, “acts that do nothing to make the harm less likely
to occur should not be excluded under Rule 407.”51 This means that remedial measures must
actually, or be reasonably calculated to, prevent future harm.52 Otherwise, if the conduct does
nothing to reduce the potential of future injury or harm, it cannot implicate the social policy
underlying the rule of encouraging injury-reducing repairs.53 This policy would also not be
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implicated by acts that were not done voluntarily because use of such remedial actions at trial
would not deter other potential defendants from taking remedial measures that may save them
from later litigation.54
i.

Measures Taken by Third Party
It is recognized that remedial measures taken by a nonparty to the litigation are outside

the scope of exclusion under Rule 407.55 For example, in Dixon v. International Harvester
Co.,56 the plaintiff employee sued the defendant tractor manufacturer for personal injuries that
allegedly resulted from a defective cab design.57 The Fifth Circuit allowed evidence that after
the plaintiff’s injury, his employer, who was not a party to litigation, took protective steps to
prevent future similar injuries by modifying the tractor cab design.58 The court held that
evidence of remedial steps taken by a nonparty were outside the scope of Rule 407 and were
circumstantially admissible to show that the tractor was improperly designed.59 The court
reasoned that the policy of not “discouraging defendants from making necessary repairs or
changes to products or dangerous conditions” was not applicable where the remedial measures
were taken by a nonparty to the litigation.60
Similarly in TLT-Babcock v. Emerson Elec. Co.,61 the Fourth Circuit held that evidence
of remedial modifications to the design of a ventilation system was properly admitted because it
was made by the city, a nonparty to the litigation, and not by the defendant who originally
designed the system.62 The court reasoned that circumstantial use of such evidence was proper
because a nonparty “will not be inhibited from taking remedial measures if such actions are
allowed into evidence against the defendant.”63
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In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Williams,64 the court distinguished the exclusion of
subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant from a nonparty. The Fifth Circuit opined
that the admissibility of preventive remedial measures by a defendant should not be used against
that defendant at trial as an implied admission of liability.65 However, remedial measures taken
by a nonparty can be admitted against a defendant because the nonparty will not be dissuaded
from taking future remedial measures since the evidence in question is not being offered against
it.66 The court reasoned that evidence of repairs made by the State Highway Department, which
was not a party to the suit, was properly admitted to circumstantially show that a railroad
crossing was hazardous before and after the injury and prior to the repair.67
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that since the express language of the rule does
nothing to distinguish “between measures taken by defendants and nondefendants” it should be
used to “excludes any measure, which, if taken, would have made the event less likely to occur”
regardless of who takes such measures.68 Our proposal does not incorporate this view because as
Saltzburg himself notes that courts usually hold that Rule 407 is inapplicable to exclude remedial
measures taken by “parties who are not responsible for the injury or harm”69 since a nonparty to
the litigation “will not be inhibited from taking remedial measures if those measures are used
against a defendant.”70
In line with Saltzburg’s observation, the Third Circuit in Diehl v. Blaw-Knox,71 opined
that “admission of remedial measures by a nonparty necessarily will not expose that nonparty to
liability, and therefore will not discourage the nonparty from taking the remedial measures in the
first place.”72 Citing a myriad of cases, the court noted that each of the circuits to address the
issue has concluded that “Rule 407 does not apply to subsequent remedial measures taken by a
nonparty.”73 Courts can still exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by
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nonparties under Rule 403 as being unfairly prejudicial or under Rule 401 and Rule 402 as not
relevant.74
ii.

Governmental Mandate
Rule 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures “taken by a party

in response to government regulations.”75 This exception to the exclusionary force of the rule is
a recognition that the social policy behind the rule of encouraging corrective measures to reduce
future harm does not apply when corrective action is “mandated by a superior governmental
authority,”76 because such mandate would not, in other circumstances, dissuade the defendant
from taking remedial actions.77
Several circuits have discussed the issue extensively. For instance, the Fifth Circuit in
Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc.,78 opined that evidence of remedial measures “made solely in response
to new federal environmental requirements” and not in response to the accident that gave rise to
the suit was not a remedial measure contemplated by Rule 407 and was admissible.79 The Ninth
Circuit in In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,80 held that when remedial measures were not taken
voluntarily by the defendant, “the admission of [such] measure[s] into evidence does not
‘punish’ the defendant for his efforts to remedy his safety problems.”81 Additionally, the Eighth
Circuit in O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc.,82 explained that evidence of remedial measures compelled by
superior governmental authority is circumstantially admissible against a defendant “because the
policy goal of encouraging remediation would not necessarily be furthered by exclusion of such
evidence.”83
IV.

THE 1997 AMENDMENT DOES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE
RULE
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Legal scholars have argued that the 1997 amendment to Rule 407, that expressly limits
exclusion of remedial measures to those taken after an event causing injury or harm, does not
properly implement the public policy that underlies the rule.84 Professor Rice reasons that if
potential defendants may be held to have implied their negligence, culpability, or strict product
liability by taking remedial measures, there would be no incentive to take precautions at the time
they become apparent.85 In effect, would-be defendants would purposefully hold off on taking
remedial measures in order to take advantage of the “one bite for free” concept.86
The limiting language of the rule fails to recognize the nature of the critical event that is
central in both negligence and strict liability cases.87 Professor Rice reasons that since the
purpose of the subsequent remedial measures rule is to encourage safety measures, “it should be
of no consequence that the safety measure (including a design change) was taken before the
accident that gave rise to the action.”88 Specifically, in negligence cases, a defendant cannot be
held liable for an injury that follows remedial measures because the defendant would “not have
breached [its] duty of care at the time of the injury, regardless of earlier negligence.”89 In strict
product liability cases, the requirement of injury as a prerequisite for exclusion of remedial
measures does nothing to encourage would-be defendants to “come forward with voluntary
recalls or repairs to their products” before injury occurs.90 It also fails to recognize that evidence
of remedial measures is not required to find a defendant strictly liable.91 Evidence that the
product was defective at the time that it was released into the stream of commerce will be
sufficient to establish a prima facia case.92
Prior to the 1997 amendment, a number federal circuits excluded evidence of postmanufacture pre-accident remedial measures under the authority of Rule 407, not per Rule 403,
holding that the policy of the rule required that such modifications be excluded when offered to
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show negligence, culpability, or strict product liability. While these cases constitute a minority
position, they correctly reflect the underlying public policy. Some courts have defined the
“event” language in the rule as the date of sale. For example, in Petree v. Victor Fluid Power,
Inc.,93 the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly refused to admit evidence that the
defendant manufacturer began to affix warning labels on a hydraulic press prior to the accident.94
The court reasoned that exclusion under Rule 407 was based on sound public policy intended to
encourage manufacturers in taking remedial measures in order to prevent potential or future
harm.95 The Third Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded
evidence of post-sale pre-accident warning modifications under this rule because the underlying
policy was “equally as supportive of exclusion of evidence of safety measures taken before
someone is injured by a newly manufactured product” as after.96 Later, in the same circuit, in
Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co.,97 the court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of postmanufacture, pre-accident modifications to a forklift under Rule 407.98 The Third Circuit relied
on Petree and recognized that since “people are loath to take actions which increase the risk of
losing a lawsuit,” the rule can properly be applied to exclude pre-accident conduct as a matter of
social policy.99 The court ultimately held that while the express language of Rule 407 did not
require the exclusion of pre-accident remedial measures, the policy considerations that form the
basis of the rule justify such exclusion.100
Some other courts have treated the “event” language in the rule as being the date of
manufacture. On point, in Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,101 the plaintiff, the decedent’s survivor,
brought suit against the defendant aircraft manufacturer alleging that the defective design of the
airplane’s control assembly caused the aircraft to crash.102 The plaintiff tried to introduce a
revised shop manual, published shortly before the accident, explaining how to install the control
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assembly such as to avoid locking-up of the ailerons.103 The court noted that the exclusion of
post-manufacture pre-accident remedial measures under Rule 407 “would conform to the policy
expressed in Rule 403” of excluding evidence that may confuse the jury.104 The court reasoned
that evidence of “subsequent changes in the product or its design, threatens to confuse the jury
by diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the relevant time to what was
done later.”105 The jury’s attention should be “directed to whether the product was reasonably
safe at the time it was manufactured” and not at the remedial measures taken after the fact.106 As
such, the Fifth Circuit held that the modified manual was properly excluded under Rule 407
because it could have been viewed by the jury as an admission of a defect in product design.107
Similarly, in Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp.,108 the plaintiff was injured while operating the
defendant’s hose assembly machine when his pant leg was caught in the revolving hose.109 He
alleged that as he pulled his leg away from the machine in an effort to reach the shut-off switch,
the machine toppled over him, causing the protective guard to open and to expose the plaintiff to
rotating machinery.110 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of subsequent remedial measures, such as additional stabilization control, to prevent tipping and
other safety features, taken by the company after the 1968 manufacture of the machine, but prior
to the 1991 injury.111 The district court held that evidence of pre-accident, post-manufacture,
remedial measures should be excluded because the “policy concerns behind Rule 407, such as
promoting the improvement of product safety, significantly outweigh Plaintiffs' request for
admission of subsequent remedial measures.”112
Other federal courts, prior to the 1997 amendment, have held that the language of Rule
407 did not require exclusion of post-manufacture pre-accident remedial measures. However,
these courts still concluded that such evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403 so as to
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further the policy basis for Rule 407. For example, in Raymond v. Raymond Corp.,113 the
decedent was operating a 1981 Model 75 sideloader in the course of his employment at Edgcomb
Metals in 1987.114 He was fatally injured when his sideloader collided with a steak beam.115 On
appeal from a verdict in the defendant’s favor on the question of defective product design,116 the
plaintiff alleged that the district court had improperly excluded evidence of pre-accident remedial
measures and moved in limine to introduce evidence regarding the “addition of a back-plate to
[the defendant’s] Model 76 sideloader, which was first manufactured in 1983,” two years after
the manufacture of the Model 75 sideloader at issue and also four years before the accident.117
After finding that Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases,118 the court held that only measures
which take place after the “event” causing injury or harm are excluded under the express
language of the rule.119 Since the design modifications took place prior to the accident, the court
noted that Rule 407 does not preclude the admissibility of such evidence.120 However, the court
excluded the evidence in question under Rule 403 as being more prejudicial than probative,
relying on the relevancy basis underlying Rule 407 as a reason.121 Such evidence could
reasonably confuse the jury and divert its attention from the condition of the product at the time
that it entered the stream of commerce to other matters outside of the scope of the jury’s review.
Further on point, in Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,122 the plaintiff was seriously
injured in 1992 when her daughter’s 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 SEL rolled from its parking spot
and struck her down and ran over her ankle.123 In a suit for strict liability, the plaintiff alleged
that a park ignition interlock, which would have prevented her from removing her key if the car
was in any other gear than “park,” would have prevented her injury.124 The plaintiff wanted to
introduce evidence showing that Mercedes Benz began to install a park ignition interlock system
in all 1990 models.125 Citing Raymond, the court stated that the exclusion of evidence under the
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express language of Rule 407 “does not apply where, as here, the modification took place before
the accident that precipitated the suit.”126 Ultimately, the First Circuit held that evidence of preinjury modifications, while not expressly excluded by Rule 407, must nonetheless be excluded
under Rule 403 as it “may reasonably be found unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and
misleading to the jury” for resolving the strict liability claim.127 The court reasoned that the
policy behind Rule 407, of not discouraging preventive acts that would reduce the chance of
future injury or harm, would be furthered if such evidence were excluded.
The Fifth Circuit, in Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,128 was faced with similar facts. There, the
decedent was killed when his 1975 Ford truck swerved and collided into a second truck that was
heading in the opposite direction.129 The decedent’s widow and two minor children brought a
wrongful death suit against the manufacturer of the truck, Ford Motor Co., alleging that the
truck’s suspension system was defective.130 On appeal, the plaintiffs complained that the district
court had improperly excluded evidence that some time after the manufacture and sale of the
Ford truck in question, but before the accident itself, “Ford changed the spacer block assembly
for 1976 and 1977 model trucks, casting it as one unit.”131 The plaintiffs intended to show that
had the decedent’s truck incorporated the alternative design, the accident would not have
occurred.132 However, the court noted that Ford had already conceded that the alternative design
was feasible.133 As such, the policy and relevancy consideration supporting exclusion under
Rule 407 allowed the court to properly exclude evidence of pre-injury remedial measures by
applying Rule 403 in order to protect defendants who take the initiative to make preventive
corrections from implying any wrongful conduct as “cumulative, [and] at worst, unfair,
misleading, or confusing.”134
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As a result of differing judicial interpretation and application of Rule 407, the need for
clarification was necessary. During the April 22, 1996 meeting of the Judiciary Advisory
Committee in Washington D.C., two unnamed commentators proposed to extend the rule to
products liability actions in order to “bar evidence of remedial measures taken after the sale of
the product even if the changes occurred before the event causing injury or harm.”135 This
proposal was rejected as being unnecessary without the benefit of a discussion or reasons.136
Even though the Advisory Committee failed to undertake a revision of the rule, some
independent organizations and courts had recognized the need to expand exclusion under Rule
407 and to include pre-event remedial measures regardless of the underlying cause of action –
negligence or strict products liability.137
A. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
One of the most influential proponents of a revision to the language of the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a whole, including Rule 407, is the NCCUSL, a non-profit unincorporated
association comprised of approximately three hundred commissioners – law practitioners and
legal academicians.138 The organization is endorsed by the ABA to promote uniformity among
state rules and procedures.139 The NCCUSL has been working toward uniformity in state laws
since 1892,140 and began its partnership with the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1940 to
produce the UCC.141
Unlike the language of the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
proposed Rule 407 within the Uniform Rules of Evidence would have precluded the
admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture, pre-injury remedial measures.142 This expansion
of the scope of exclusion under the rule is achieved by defining the term “event” to include the
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“sale of a product to a user or consumer” in the last sentence of the Rule.143 Defining the scope
of the critical “event” was intended to reflect the judgment of the commissioners that the social
policy of the rule would be better served if all would-be defendants were given “an incentive to
take remedial measured before the injury, or harm, giving rise to the cause of action.”144
B. The Evidence Project
Professor Paul Rice is another influential legal authority and reform proponent. He has
been a constant critic of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as
the current state of the federal rules.145 In order to further his reform initiative, Professor Rice
has established the Evidence Project,146 an extensive agenda of proposed changes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence created through a seminar course in evidence taught at the Washington
College of Law of the American University.147 Professor Rice explains that the proposed
revisions to the Federal Rules are intended to create “consistency within the rule and between the
rules, consistency with the theory of our adjudicatory process, [and] consistency with the
Constitution.”148
The proposed Rule 407, as presented by the Evidence Project, would result in the total
exclusion of all evidence of remedial measures, regardless of when they were taken.149 This
result is accomplished by removing any reference to the critical “event” language that would
otherwise trigger exclusion under the rule.150 Professor Rice notes that the limitation in the
current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, excluding evidence of remedial measures
only if taken after an event that causes injury or harm, makes the rule difficult to apply151
especially in situations where the decision to repair was made before an accident, but the repair
was not actually made until after the accident, or where studies about the need for repair were
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made before the accident, but the decision to make such repairs followed the accident.152 He
concludes that “if all remedial measure[s] were made privileged, the current difficulties and
conflicts [in applying the rule] would be avoided.”153
C. Illinois Exclusion of Remedial Measures
Illinois evidentiary rulings, like Federal Rule 407,154 exclude evidence of remedial
measures in negligence155 and strict liability actions.156 However, in a substantial departure from
the Federal Rule, Illinois courts do not admit evidence of remedial measures taken prior to the
event that gave rise to the cause of action.157 Illinois courts have reasoned that to allow the
admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture preventive changes would have an adverse effect
on future safety advancements.158 For this reason, Illinois courts exclude evidence of
improvements taken before or after an event causing an injury in both strict liability and
negligence cases.159 This is also the position of several other state courts.160
In a strict liability case, Smith v. Black & Decker,161 after accidentally amputating his left
hand with a power miter saw, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the
design of the saw was defective because it was not equipped with a right lower blade guard.162
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Illinois appellate court held that the trial court had properly granted the
defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of post-manufacture, pre-injury modifications to the
miter saw.163 The court reasoned that “the same policy consideration, i.e., the potential chilling
effect on safety improvements is present in product liability actions as in negligence actions
regardless of whether the modification were pre-injury or post injury.”164
Several years later in Brown v. Ford Motor Co.,165 the plaintiff, a survivor of a van
explosion, brought a product liability action against the defendant manufacturer alleging that
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faulty nylon fuel lines in the van melted and leaked gasoline, and that this was the direct cause of
the explosion.166 The Illinois appellate court found that the trial court properly excluded
evidence that after the sale of the van in question, but before the accident, the defendant had
changed the fuel lines from plastic to metal.167 Citing Smith v. Black & Decker, the court held
that the public policy underlying the exclusion of remedial measures applies to bar the
admissibility of such evidence regardless of whether it was taken before or after the accident.168
In Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,169 a case based on a negligence cause of action, the
plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
when flammable vapors from his clothing were ignited by the flame of a gas-fired hot water
heater.170 Noting that the relevant time period in a negligent manufacture cause of action is the
“time of sale or manufacture,”171 the court reasoned that to allow the admissibility of pre-injury
remedial measured to show negligence would “have a chilling effect on the incentive to improve
safety” in mass produced and widely-used products.172 The Illinois appellate court held that the
exclusion of evidence that the manufacturer of a water heater had placed warning labels on its
heaters after the date of manufacture, but before the date of injury, was proper.173
V.

PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 407
We basically reach the same conclusion as does Professor Rice, although our proposal

relies more on the evidentiary relevancy rationale for amending the rule than the social policy
rationale that he and his project have advanced. Nonetheless, we endorse the language that he
has proposed for amending Rule 407. The amended rule should read as follows:
Remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence, culpable
conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for
a warning or instruction. Evidence of remedial measures may be admitted
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if offered for impeachment or another purpose, if controverted, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measure.
Removing the “after an injury or harm” language from the text of the current rule is
intended to explicitly state that exclusion under the rule is not restricted to remedial measures
taken after an event.174 The removal of any language referring to an “event” is aimed at reducing
confusion as to the meaning or scope of the rule. Although terms can be qualified or defined
within the text of a rule, removing the phrase completely would foster uniform decisions and
encourage consistency, both textual and logical, within the rule in question and between all of
the rules together.175 This proposed rule would clearly conform Rule 407 to the public policy
that underlies the exclusion of remedial measures as an admission of negligence, culpability, or
product defect, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The proposed amendment to the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence will

encourage, without limitation, individuals, corporations, and municipalities to make remedial
measures which would prevent future injury or harm. Such remedial measures, whether taken
before or after an injury, must not be deemed to be admissions of negligence, culpability, product
defect, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. When courts admit
evidence of pre-injury remedial actions they act contrary to the public policy of the rule and
create a danger of jury confusion by providing them evidence that is more prejudicial than
probative on the material issues in the case.
To counter this problem, some federal courts have excluded pre-injury remedial measures
under a Rule 403 balancing process. In their view, Rule 403 operates to further the policy that
underlies Rule 407. In our view, Rule 403 is not the answer. In order to promote logical
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consistency within Rule 407 and among the other Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule itself, and
not Rule 403, should control the exclusion of evidence of remedial measures.
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